Covenant Against Incumbrances by Vesper, Frank F.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 67
the social policy of not enforcing illegal contracts in order to prevent
their formation, against the equities of the parties in the particular case,
and found the latter more persuasive. Since the parties are in pari delicto,
this position is not untenable,' but not many courts will permit recovery,
even in quasi-contracts. 4 .
J.B.S.
CONVEYANCES
COVENANT AGAINST INCUMBRANCES
The plaintiff purchased a lot from the defendant by warranty deed
with covenant against incumbrances. A natural watercourse on the
premises had been covered with concrete and sod in such a manner
that it was not visible, and neither party knew of its existence. This
covering collapsed causing damage to the building on the property. In
a suit against the grantor, the court held that the concealed watercourse,
which had existed less than twenty-one years, was not such an incum-
brance as to constitute a breach of the covenant against incumbrances.'
When a purchaser is injured by defective tide in the realty pur-
chased, he usually must seek his recourse through an action for breach
of an express covenant. In real property there are few implied war-
ranties, in the absence of statutes creating them, and, except in the case
of leases, none are implied from the mere conveyance of land.2 Where
the defect in title is not inconsistent with the passing of the estate, as in
the principal case, the covenant against incumbrances seems the plausible
one on which to seek recovery. It is sometimes said that the covenant
against incumbrances warrants against any right or interest of another
to the diminution of the value or use of the land, but not inconsistent
with the passing of the estate.3 This covenant extends to easements,4
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rights of dower,' and to adverse claims such as outstanding mortgages,'
liens,' and unpaid taxes.' Easements of private ways,' rights to enter
land for specific purposes," rights to take water or divert it, and to flood
lands are also incumbrances within the purview of the grantor's cove-
nant.1 Some jurisdictions hold that a public highway on the premises
is within the covenant against incumbrances, = but the majority of courts
contend that there is an implied exception of a highway from the
covenant. The majority bases this exception on the grounds that the
highway is apparent, and the condition irremediable, and the parties
know of such conditions." Courts are more reluctant to give effect to
the knowledge of the easement when a railroad right of way is involved,
holding the covenant breached by the existence of a valid right of way
whether known or not.1 Where public sewers and drains, buried
under the ground and unknown to the parties, or where other easements
of a public character, such as irrigation and drainage ditches are involved,
many courts do not consider them within the covenant because of their
beneficial effect on the premises. 5
The right to the natural flow and fall of water on land is not
considered an easement but a right connected with the interest in land,
and so natural watercourses have not been held to be within the covenant
against incumbrances." Although the principal case is concerned with
a natural stream, the damage resulted from the artificial character
of the covered watercourse. An artificial structure does not in itself
constitute an incumbrance." There must be some legally enforceable
right in some third person in the artificial character before it is an
incumbrance." In the case of a license there is no right which another
can enforce to the diminution of the estate of the covenantee." Here
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also there is no legal right in another in the artificial character of the
watercourse. In the principal case it was decided that where the cover-
ing of the watercourse has existed less than the statutory period, so that
no prescriptive right arose, there was no incumbrance within the coven-
ant. But in the case of Stanfield v. Schneidewind, similar in facts to
the principal case, the New Jersey court held that no prescriptive right
arises from such artificial character even though it has existed more than
the statutory period, for the legal character of the watercourse has not
changed, and no right in another has attached. No one has an interest
in the covering except the owner of the land; he can remove it, replace
or repair it at will, and can if he so desires return it to its original state
as an open brook.
In the principal case the purchaser suffered considerable damage to a
building on the premises by the collapse of the covering of the water-
course, but he has no recourse against his grantor under the usual
covenants of a warranty deed. This is a risk he assumes, unconsciously
perhaps, when he purchases realty. He might be able to protect himself
by a special covenant of freedom from hidden watercourses and similar
defects, but perhaps his best protection is a more careful examination
of the premises which may follow an awareness of the risk involved.
F. F. V.
THE EFFECT OF EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS ON CONVEY-
ANCES - CLEAR TITLE - MARKETABLE TITLE
Plaintiff contracted to purchase a certain property and defendant
agreed to convey a clear title to the land. An abstract of title was de-
manded by plaintiff. He was apprised of certain restrictions limiting
the use to which the property could be adapted and of the existence of
a record easement for driveway purposes across the rear of the premises.
There was also a driveway across the premises at a place other than
that specified in the record title. Defendant contended that such title
was a clear tide and that plaintiff, who had knowledge of the incum-
brances, was estopped from objecting to their existence. The court held
that the tide to be conveyed did not constitute a clear title and was a
breach of warranty irrespective of the grantee's knowledge of such
incumbrances.1
The court in the principal case attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween clear title and marketable title. The court said that marketable
'Stanfield v. Schneidewind, 96 N.J.L. 428, xi5 Ati. 339 (19z).
' Frank v. Murphy, 64 Ohio App. 5ox, 29 N.E. (2d) 41 (1940).
